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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----000000000----~ 
JAEGER AND BRANCH, INC., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
JIM PAPPAS dba JIM PAPPAS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
-----000000000-----
Case No. 
10885 
In the beginning Defendant was con-
vinced and counsel were convinced that the 
$6,500 check dated January 12, 1966, was made 
and forwarded to Los Angeles conditionally 
and tentatively and subject to condition pre-
cedent and were further convinced that as the 
result of hanky panky the check turned up in 
the hands of someone who pretended to be a 
holder in due course alleging to have taken 
the check in good faith and without notice. 
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Tnat this Honorable Court is blinded 
to that general situation and instead accuses 
the Defendant of trying to get a shipment of 
carpets released by use of the check in bad 
faith is bewildering. This Court has decided 
this case as though it were a case presented 
by both sides on the merits and the findings 
of fact were the result of contested issues of 
fact and that the Court were free to indulge 
in inferences and insinuations beyond anything 
found by the District Court or supported by 
the evidence. This is contrary to the Uniform 
Commercial Code which Utah has adopted. 
Appellant submits briefly four areas 
of error by this Honorable Court in arriving 
at its decision of lfovember 9, 19 6 7. ( 1) Facts 
should be resolved in favor of Appellant; (2) 
Defendant had a good defense to the check; 
(3) The burden of proof lay with the Respondent; 
(4) The Court misconseives the entire situa-
tion when it impugns the motives of Appellant. 
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(1) Facts Should be Resolved in Favor of 
Appellant 
The Court cites Nasner vs. Burton, 2 
Utah 2nd 236, 272 P. 2nd 113 (1954), as estab-
lishing the rule for review on the facts, 
namely; tha~ the facts will be taken in favor 
of Respondent. Nasner was a case tried to a 
jury with both sides presenting their evidence 
fully and without a motion to dismiss or for 
judgment. 
The instant case was a case tried on 
one side only and disposed of on a motion for 
judgment which required accepting the facts 
and the inferences therefrom against the movant. 
In 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec 295, it is 
stated that 11 A motion for judgment for lack of 
evidence is) in a jury case, equivalent to a 
demurrer to the evidence. t! In the earlier 
section 293 the similarities are pointed out 
in the three motions: (1) a motion for non-
suit, (2) a motion for directed verdict and 
(3) a demurrer to the evidence. In the instant 
case the parties stipulated that production 
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of the check endorsed to Plaintiff made a 
prirna f acie case and cast on the defendant the 
burden of going forward to prove a defense. 
This was the first real evidence in the case 
and the motion of plaintiff at the close of 
the defendant's evidence amounted, we submit, 
to a demurrer to the evidence. 
In Sections 433, 434 and 435 of 53 
Arn. Jur., Trial, the rule applicable to a 
demurrer to the evidence is stated to be that 
the truth of the evidence attached is admitted 
together with all reasonable inferences, that 
it must be taken most strongly against the 
party demurring and evidence unfavorable to 
the party attacked may be ignored by the court. 
Shields vs. Meyer, 183 Kan. 111, 325 P 2d 29 
(1958) 
5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, Sec 
886 states that an Appellate Court reviewing 
''a decision granting or denying a nonsuit or a 
dismissal, it is usually held that the evidence 
is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
b plaintiff, in whose favor inconsistencies are 
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disregarded and every legitimate inference is 
drawn on appeal." This is the rule that should 
have been applied by this court, treating the 
Appellant as though he were the plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff offered the check, which 
was stipulated to be a prima facie case putting 
upon the Defendant the burden of proceeding 
with his evidence. The Defendant's burden was 
to show that he had a defense to the check in 
the hands of the payee, under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Section 70A-3-307(3) U.C.A., 
1953. The motion for judgment, therefore, 
was directed to the narrow issue of whether 
Defendant, taking the evidence with inferences 
therefrom favorably to the Defendant had shown 
that it had a defense to the check. This 
evidence will be discussed under the next point. 
Had the motion for judgment been 
denied, Plaintiff would then have been required 
to produce evidence that it was a holder in 
due course by reason of which the defense of 
the maker of the check was cut off. That was 
the meat of the case as Defendant viewed the 
~ ~~~~~ 
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matter and the District Court never reached 
it. This Court discusses the evidence as 
though the Plaintiff had put forward its 
proof. Plaintiff preferred to make a motion 
for judgment attacking the existence of a 
defense to the original check rather than risk 
cross examination of his witnesses. 
Under the negotiable instrument law 
there was a split in the authorities, some hold-
ing, as did Utah, that where the maker of a 
note defended by showing a defect in the instru-
ment, the holder had the burden of proof by a 
preponderance of all the evidence of showing 
that he was the holder in due course, although 
some courts simply required the holder to go 
forward with evidence without the risk of 
non-persuasion. (See 12 Am.Jur. 2d, Bills and 
Notes Sec 1212) But under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code the law is plain as set out in 
Section 1213 of 12 Am.Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, 
as follows: "After it is shown that a defense 
exists a person claiming the rights of a holder 
in due course has the burden of establishing 
that he or some person under whom he claims 
pis in all respects a holder in due course. 
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"Until it is shown that a defense 
exists, the issue as to whether the holder 
is a holder in due course does not arise. 
Where it is shown that a defense exists the 
Plaintiff may, if he so elects, seek to cut 
off the defense by establishing that he is 
himself a holder in due course, or that he 
has acquired the rights of a prior holder in 
due course. On this issue he has the full 
burden of proof by a preponderance of the total 
evidence. He must sustain this burden by 
affirmative proof that the instrument was 
taken for value, that it was taken in good 
faith, and that it was taken without notice." 
(2) Defendant Had a Good Defense to the Check 
It is uncontested that on January 11, 
1966, the Defendant had overpaid Allo Distri-
buting for all merchandise received by it to 
that date (R. 74). It is further undisputed 
that Allo had requested an advance on addi-
tional furnishings not covered by the original 
contract and that Defendant had concluded to 
make such an advance (R. 50-51) provided Allo 
would not only release the carpets, but would 
ship the balance of the merchandise the receipt 
of which would result in shortage to Allo of 
$1,000.00 without the check and overpayment 
or advance payment of $5,000 to $5,500 if the 
check were honored (R. 53). 
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This was made plain in the conversa-
tion between Pappas and Allo Distributing and 
is not challenged in the record. Pappas 
specifically said in the first telephone con-
versation that he would forward the check pro-
vided Allo would ship out the remainder of the 
material under the first order of Appellant. 
He called again to say that the truck had not 
arrived, that he would stop payment on the 
check if the goods were not received on Tuesday, 
January 18th (R. 51). He called again on the 
day the payment on the check was stopped and 
informed Allo that the goods had not been 
received and receiving no satisfactory re-
sponse proceeded to stop payment on the check 
on January 18, 1966. There is no dispute in 
the evidence that the check was made condi-
tioned upon shipment of additional goods and 
there is no dispute that the goods were not 
shipped and that therefore in the hands of 
Allo Distributing the check was not valid. 
The carpets were wrongfully held up 
since Appellant had overpaid Allo for all goods 
received to that date, including the carpets 
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(3) The Burden of Proof Lay With the 
Respondent 
Section 70A-3-307 (3) deals with the 
burden of establishing both defenses to the 
check and being a holder in due course and 
provides: "(3) After it is shown that a defense 
exists a person claiming the right of a holder 
in due course has the burden of establishing 
that he or some person under whom he claims is 
in all respects a holder in due course." 
And the establishing of a defense is covered 
by Section 70A-3-306 U.C.A., 1953, of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and includes a sub-
section ( c). "The defenses of want or failure 
of consideration, non-performance of any 
condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery 
for a special purpose. 11 It is the position of 
Appellant here that there was a condition pre-
cedent to liability on the check and that the 
condition was not satisfied. It follows that 
the burden has shifted to the Plaintiff under 
Section 70A-3-307 (3), who must establish that 
he is in all respects a holder in due course, 
and who offered no evidence in support of that 
position. 
With the burden of proof on the 
Plaintiff and with the Plaintiff having made a 
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Defendant 's evidence and before putting on 
his own defense, the posture of the case is 
that Appellant's evidence and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom must be resolved in 
Appellant's favor as to establishing a defense 
and as to whether Respondent is a holder in due 
course. It is, of course, possible that the 
Court can hold that there is not a defense to 
the check from the evidence adduced with all 
inferences resolved in favor of the Defendant. 
This we doubt, and hence this appeal. 
Appellant's quarrel with the opinion 
of the Court is that the Court did not approach 
the problem as provided in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, but gave Appellant the burden of 
proof and then proceeded under a rule which 
resolved all issues of fact in favor of the 
prevailing party. 
(4) The Court Misconceived the Entire Situa-
tion When it Impugns the Motives of Appellant. 
There is no finding of fact which 
remotely suggests that the Defendant acted in 
bad faith in its negotiations with Allo Dis-
tributing over the delivery of the check in 
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exchange for merchandise due, largely paid for, 
and undelivered by Allo which was a failing 
corporation. 
The evidence is plain that the 
Defendant informed the Plaintiff that its 
relations with Allo Distributing had broken 
down and that Defendant was apprechensive 
lest he have to pay for merchandise twice, and 
that Allo had represented to Defendant that the 
Plaintiff had been paid in full for its mer-
chandise, as had all other suppliers (R. 49) 
and (R. 50). 
Far from wishing to take advantage 
of Allo Distributing the Defendant testified 
that he was willing to make an advance payment 
on merchandise as yet not ordered or selected 
to help Allo out, so long as there was full 
performance of the contract under delivery 
( R. 5 O to 5 3) . 
It was the Los Angeles people who 
were trying to pull a shenanigan. Allo was 
specifically informed by repeated phone calls 
that the check would not be honored unless 
the remaining merchandise were shipped. The 
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carpets were overpaid and released on January 
11th. This was not the problem Appellant 
was making phone calls about after January 11th 
I 
Although protesting that the shipment had left,' 
the facts are that it never did leave and 
never arrived and Allo therefore knew that it 
was in possession of a check which was not 
valid because of a condition precedent. 
Having previously told the Appellant that 
Jaeger and Branch had been paid in full Allo 
proceeded to deliver the check to Jaeger and 
Branch which had also had conversation with 
Defendant and Mrs. Voorhees and knew of the 
Defendant's concern about the entire matter, 
and also knew that someone had told Defendant 
that Jaeger and Branch were holding up the 
carpet shipment. Jaeger and Branch are 
therefore charged with knowing that the 
delivery of the check was conditional and 
several conditions had been discussed with Don 
Moreland: (a) carpets were being held up for 
some kind of payment or reason; (b) the 
relationship between Allo and Defendant had 
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deteriorated indicating differences over 
finances or deliveries; (c) additional money 
was being sent to Allo; (d) the money was not 
owing to Allo as the Appellant had indicated 
that it was fearful of paying for merchandise 
coming from Allo Distributing; (f) no mer-
chandise was delivered by the Plaintiff to 
Allo Distributing in connection with this check 
which was therefore simply a payment on account; 
(g) Plaintiff was sufficiently uncertain about 
the check that it made a long distance phone 
call to the Walker Bank in Salt Lake and more 
to the point could have returned the courtesy 
of the Defendant's phone calls of January 11th 
and inquired about the true state of affairs. 
All of these circumstances cast a 
shadow on the acceptance of the check by the 
Plaintiff and if inferences be properly drawn 
in favor of the Appellant and against the 
Plaintiff who refused to go forward with his 
evidence, it reasonably appears that Plaintiff 
had notice that there was something wrong with 
the transaction and was not a holder in due 
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Appellant's Brief at Pages 17 to 23. At 
least there was enough evidence with inferences 
therefrom to require Plaintiff to show that 
he was a holder in due course. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reconsider its 
decision. The rule of Nasner vs. Burton 
should not be applied to these facts, but the 
rule of the Uniform Commercial Code, Sec 
70A-3-307, U.C.A. 1953. When so viewed th 
facts establish a defense to the check in the 
hands of Allo Distributing. At that juncture 
the Plaintiff was compelled to go forward 
with evidence that it was a holder in due 
course. Instead, it made a motion for judgment 
which amounted to a demurrer to the evidence 
of Defendant-Appellant. It was error to grant 
this motion and the judgment of the District 
Court should be reversed. 
Appellant respectfully requests a 
rehearing in this matter. 
RICHARDS, BIRD, HART & KUMP 
by Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
M. Byron Fisher 
